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Shortly after Southern Rhodesia attained self-government in 
September 1923, a growing deficiency was reported in the supply of African 
agricultural labour. Such complaints persisted over the next four years.
The problem was most pronounced in the burgeoning cash -crop sector, centred 
principally along the high veld ridge of hashonaland; in contrast, the 
mining sector was scarcely affected, a phenomenon attributable to its 
relatively high wags levels and stable manpower requirements.(1) Likewise, 
it made little impact upon the stagnant ranching industry of Matabeleland 
and the Mashonaland low veld districts. European cultivators, who comprised 
a substantial block of voters, however ensured, that a problem which in 
reality affected only a minority of Rhodesian employers maintained a centre- 
stage position in the political arena. The period 1924-28 was accordingly 
characterised by a vociferous campaign for the augmentation of labour 
supplies, a move spearheaded by the Rhodesia Agricultural Union (R.A.U.), 
main spokesman for the farmer interest, which assumed leadership in the 
demand for remedial action by the now government.
The primary purpose of this paper is to ascertain and evaluate those 
factors immediately responsible for the crisis, and to demonstrate that it 
was caused by excessive demand rather than, as many settlers claimed, the 
inherent idleness of indigenous Africans. A certain amount of purely 
descriptive material has been incorporated to set the episode within its 
immediate historical, economic and political background, and the topic of 
African labour has been broadly defined to embrace such relevant matters 
as immigration, wage and employment policies, and the Government's response 
to agitation for the maximisation of labour supplies.
Neither the labour crisis nor settler demands for official inter- 
vention to improve supplies was without precedent.(2) During the 1890s, 
employers had complained aboi.it African reluctance to seek work, and Native 
Commissioners responded by recruiting labour on their behalf, often by force. 
A clash between Imperial authorities and Chartered Company resulted in the 
cessation of official recruiting or direct coercion, but the pioneer phase 
of Rhodesian employment history created the attitude of mind that in times 
of labour shortage it was incumbent upon the Government actively to induce, 
and if necessary oblige, Africans to find employment. Such opinions were 
still current in the 1920s.
The 1924-28 situation was anticipated by a pre-war agricultural 
boom which generated consider,able pressure on labour supplies. At length, 
the Company bowed to white farmer demands and instructed Native Ccarinissioners 
to address meetings of traditional leaders on the desirability of their 
followers seeking work. These instructions were withdrawn at Imperial 
request when certain grave abuses were reported;(3) thereafter, officials 
were ordered to restrict their activities to propagandising the doctrine of 
labour as a necessary civilising function,(4) a policy that henceforth became 
a guiding principle of the Native Department.
Depletion of white manpower during the Great War, ensuing economic 
dislocation and depression of world commodity prices, a series of bad seasons 
and the 1918 influenza epidemic all materially contributed to a slow growth- 
rate in the European crop sector between 1914 and 1923.(5) Labour* supplies 
generally kept pace with demand, and few complaints of shortage were heard. 
The return of favourable economic conditions from early 1924 onwards inspired 
increased agricultural activity that at times bordered on the feverish, and, 
as many producers later discovered to their cost, was justified neither by 
the modest upswing in commodity prices overseas nor the undeveloped state
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of marketing facilities for Rhodesian produce in Britain. As a result 
of agricultural speculation over the next four years,(6) pressure on 
available labour supplies gathered momentum until it reached a peak corres­
ponding with the 1926-27 growing season. It is significant that the two 
crops directly responsible for this trend, cotton and tobacco (see Tables 
VIII and IX) required more labourers per acre(7) than the traditional staple 
of Rhodesian farmers, maize.
Agitation for augmented labour supplies corresponded closely with 
successive booms in these; two crops. the first letter expressing anxiety 
about future supplies appeared in the Rhrdesian press shortly after the 
harvesting of the first successful cotton cron (1923/24), and was succeeded 
by a lengthy correspondence extending tip to the retrenchment of labour in 
the tobacco industry from A^ril 1928 onwards. Taken as a vhole, this 
protracted correspondence provides an illuminating insight into settler 
thinking on the so-called ’Native Puestion'', which, as the Chief Native 
Commissioner perceptively remarked, was seen largely in terms of the 
African's apparent disinclination to offer his services to white employers.(8) 
Many letters reflected the familiar stereotype Africans were inherently 
idle? they had too much land; they were improvident; they had ’no 
ambition beyond the next beer drink’. (9)
.African sloth was attributed to the breakdown of what was conceived 
to have been the former despotic powers of chiefs and headmen. The young 
men no longer listened when they were advised to seek work? imprisonment 
for failure to pay tax held no terrors as there was no stigma attached to 
a prison record. Echoing the Evolutionist thinking that characterised 
anthropological thought of the day, Ethel Tawse Jollie portrayed the apparent 
addicticnof Africans to a life of beer-drinking and idleness as an inevitable 
result of the clash between a superior (European) and inferior (African) 
culture.(10) The solution propounded was one advocated by the vast majority 
of Europeans, including Native E*pertinent officials- the doctrine of labour. 
It had obvious attractions, combining the satisfaction of settler labour 
needs with the characteristically Victorian conviction that writ had an 
ennobling effect uoon the individual. Labour would thus be !,gocd for the 
African”, and above all, it would arrest the degeneration of tribal society 
into a state of feckless anarchy.
A second contrasting theme in the campaign was the hostility shown 
towards the fostering of cash-crop agriculture in the reserves which, it was 
felt, would reduce the supply of workers and inevitably lead to competition 
between black and white farmers. This latter contention was less frequently 
voiced than the former in the 1924-28 period, and did not receive widespread 
popular support until the onset of the Great Depression.(11) It was 
briefly anticipated by protests against Native Department distribution of 
cotton seed to /Africans in 1924, voiced at a cotton growers' conference on 
12 November 1924. A succession of speakers complained about the Govern­
ment's apparent encouragement of African competition and expressed misgivings 
lest careless cultivation should lead to the spread of insect nests to 
European cotton crocs. However, the rain objection raised was in connection 
with the effect of African cotton- graving uran labour supplies.(12)
Feelings ran so high during the ensuing season that a Bulawayo ginner . 
refused to do business with African producers or any Europeans who helped 
them grew cotton. (13) They subsided after the failure of both European and 
African crops in 1924-25 and 1925-26, and, since no attempt was made to 
foster Virginia tobacco cultivation in the reserves, remained in suspense 
until the Depression.
3A great deal of thought and ingenuity was devoted to the question 
of how labour supplies could.be increased. Solutions ranging fran outright 
compulsion to the improvement of working conditions were advanced in the 
press and on public platforms. Coercion of labour was advocated by a minority 
of extremists; one Rhodesia Herald correspondent recarmended that each kraal 
should be required to provide a fixed percentage of able -bodied men for farm 
work, to be engaged on three to six month agreements made before a Government 
official. (14) The Sinoia farmer H.Beamish maintained that sines the Govern­
ment made use of compulsory labour to erect tse-tse fly fences, it was 
inconsistent for officials to oppose a call-out of workers for private 
employers. (15) Such bald demands were relatively uncommon. The broader 
spectrum of farmer opinion couched its requests more elliptically, calling 
upon the Government to extend its role in the labour field through the 
medium of official recruiting agencies.(16)
These proposals, put forward only a short time after the changeover 
from Chartered Corrtnany rule, placed the fledgling ministry of Sir Charles 
Coghlan in an invidious position. On the one hand, the Imperial government 
and overseas humanitarian pressure groups imposed obvious limitations(17) 
upon the Colony's freedom of action- any attemot to establish a Government labo 
bureau or coerce labour in response to settler demands would have evoked a 
storm of protest damaging to Rhodesia's refutation in Britain. On the other 
hand, farming interests comprised an absolute majority in eleven out of thirty 
parliamentary constituencies; insufficient to win control, but sufficient to 
displace an incumbent government in collaboration with an opposition party.(18)
Given the circumstances of the time, Coghlan's administration behaved 
With commendable probity in the face of severe pressure, although it ccnmitted 
one error of judgment that will be discussed later. Its response to the 
cri.aj s was shaped by two basic principles; a spirit of Victorian laissez 
faire, and a belief that compulsion of labour for private purposes was morally 
indefensible. Coghlan denied it was the responsibility of any government to 
secure labour supplies and condemned the notion of official recruitment as 
anathema.(19) Like the fixing of wage levels, it was a function that 
belonged properly to the private sector. IT.M. Leggate, successively 
Minister of Agriculture and Colonial Secretary,(20) warned the R.A.U. Congress 
that if the Government was forced to submit to its demands, employers would 
have to accept the reciprocal right of government to control wages.(21) 
Throughout the duration of the crisis, Ministers emphasised that the solution 
- namely, better rewards, rations and living conditions to attract labourers - 
lay with the farmers themselves.
The Government adopted a similar stance on such indirect forms of 
inducement as increased taxation of indigenous Africans, remission of tax 
in the case of those who worked for a given period ahnually, or a combination 
of both; one farmer recarmended a basic tax of £5, to be remitted at the 
rate of 10% for each month worked during the year. (22) Coghlan condemned 
the R.A.U.'s proposal that Native Tax should be raised fran £1 to £2 as 
'a particularly odious form of compulsion because of its hypocrisy'.(23)
Revenue considerations, as well as moral principle, impelled, the Government 
to reject the tax remission proposal and a cognate request that non-indigenous 
Africans should be exempted fran the payment of Native Tax, both of which 
if implemented would have contributed an indirect state subsidy to the 
European producer. The new government could ill afford to lose the £50 000 
paid each year by non-Rhodesian Africans, plus an indeterminate but probably 
substantial proportion of the ih million represented by indigenous Native 
Tax at a time when annual receipts were only about £2 millions. (24)
A number of other suggestions were likewise turned down or ignored 
by the Government. The 1925 R.A.U. Congress asked the Government to release 
non-indigenous workers employed on roads and call upon traditional leaders 
to provide replacements, following the Kenya precedent.(25) There were 
requests for a tightening-up on passes to seek work in urban areas, so that 
a person who remained unemployed after a given short period would be sent 
to a specific farmer;(26) a reintroduction of travelling passes for 
indigenous Africans, restricting the movement of their bearers to districts 
with acute labour shortages;(27) and the resumption of the 1910-11 practice 
of holding meetings in the reserves to persuade Africans to seek work. (28)
Two further proposals - the recruitment of Indians from outside Rhodesia's 
borders and a curb on European inmigration - aroused so much opposition 
that the Government for once avoided censure.
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However, there were still many ways in which the Government could 
alleviate the problem without necessarily betraying its principles, and 
political realities ensured that it made a substantial, though on the whole 
inefficacious contribution to a possible solution. Despite its frequent 
disavowal of responsibility, the Government in fact devoted much effort to 
fostering the supply of indigenous labour, and facilitating the flew of 
migrant labour frcm the two northern territories.
In its endeavours to improve the purely local labour supply, the 
Government directed its attention to three potential sources- the reserves, 
urban areas, and clandestine flow; of migrants over the Limpopo. Following 
the guidelines established after the 1910-11 forced labour scandals, Native 
Carmissianers continued to exhort Africans to seek work, employers registered 
their needs and Africans who enquired about vacancies were suitably informed. (29)
Few availed themselves of this service, as they felt that only employers with 
obviously bad records sought assistance from Native Conmissioners. Several
largely unfounded allegations about the quantity of "loafers” in urban areas 
moved the Government to repeal the earlier prohibition of recruitment by 
labour agents within townships. (30) Since urban wage-levels were generally 
higher than elsewhere and the number of genuine so-called loafers’* small, .
the new provision made no substantial contribution to labour supplies, and 
one suspects the Government was making what amounted to a token gesture 
merely to mollify its critics. Finally, it strove to check the illicit 
leakage of labour into South Africa condoned by the Transvaal authorities.
An official approach was made to Pretoria, requesting the proper enforcement 
of the embargo against immigration of Africans from areas north of latitude 
22° South, (31) but the Transvaal, which vjas likevdse short of labour, took 
no action until the Depression. When these overtures failed, the Government 
asked the Railways to co-operate by not issuing tickets to South African- 
bound .migrants. As the overwhelming majority entered the Transvaal on foot 
along more easterly routes, the interdict had little effect on the labour 
outflow.
The Government's most significant contribution lay in the provision 
of assistance to facilitate the passage of independent” 'migrants from the 
north. Non-Rhodesian labourers were popular with farmers because there was 
little likelihood that, following the custom of local Africans, they would 
suddenly leave employment to plough or harvest their own crops; for this 
reason they were considered more reliable and efficient. Furthermore, govern­
ment and settlers alike were at all times deeply conscious of the absolute 
necessity of sustaining the inflow? of migrants, not only to stabilise local 
wage-levels but also to provide sufficient unskilled labour for the colony's 
expanding economic enterprises. Well over half of Rhodesia's black manpower
thodesian
and Rhodesian Africans in employment steadily narrowed u p to 1929 (see 
Table I).
Migrant labour fell into two categories: independent, so-called 
"voluntary" supplies and Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (R.N.L.B.) recruits. 
”\fc>luntary" labourers travelled on foot along wp 11-established routes from 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. entering Mashonaland at any one of a number 
of "ports of entry5 such as Mrewa, Mtoko, Mount Darwin, Miami and Sipolilo? 
Mozambique migrants travelled by rail via Umtali. August and September 
were the peak months for immigration (see Table IV) , while a net outflow 
occurred between April and June. The journey across the Zambesi was a 
rigorous one, espoially in years of drought when food was short, and 
independent migrants were often obliged to accept the first work offered 
upon arrival. Fanners in the extreme northern districts capitalised on 
this by offering exceedingly low wages: in 1923, it was reported that some 
farm employees in Mrewa and Darwin received only 5/*~ per month. (32)
Remedial action in the form of food stations had been reocmnended in 
1921,(33) but economic conditions delayed reforms until afte r the change 
of government. The revival of demand led to a fresh initiative, this time 
fron the R.N.L.B., which opened food stations at Mrewa and Mount Darwin 
towards the end of 1924 and offered necessitous migrants three month contracts 
with local employers at prescribed rates of pay. Northern Mashonalond 
farmers vehemently protested, arguing that the Bureau was so unpopular v./ith 
migrants that they would avoid Rhodesia altogether, leading to a consequent 
rise in wages in the faming industry. (34) The Government bowed to popular 
clamour in July 1925 and requested the R.N.L.B. to close down its stations. 
Three months later it stepped into the breach, re-opened the food stations 
as a government enterprise and appointed a European official to supervise 
facilities. The scheme was extended to other districts along the frontier 
over the next few yars? in September 1927 the Government operated twelve 
free ferries, nineteen food stations and had made a start on rudimentary 
rest camps along labour routes.(35)
It is unlikely that these endeavours brought about any marked improve- 
m nt in the labour supply; available figures indicate that the number of 
non- indigenous Africans employed in the colony was virtually stationary during 
the crisis (see Table I). Sane employers complained, probably with justifi­
cation, that the issue of rations merely enabled migrants to press on 
further to South Africa. (36) But economic development in the two northern 
territories was probably a weightier consideration. linn 1925 onwards, the 
Copperbelt attracted large numbers of workers who had earlier locked to 
Southern Rhodesia for employment. Between 1924 and 1927, the African tobacco 
industry in Ifyasaland underwent a surge of production ended only by the 
Imperial Tobacco Company’s drastic reduction in prices offered to African 
growers in March 1927.(37) The sudden rise in the number of northern 
Africans registered towards the end of that year (Table TV) , a factor which 
incidentally paved the way to the termination of Rhodesia's crisis in 1928, 
may be attributed with same certainty to this event.
Official policy as regards recruited migrant labour and the organis­
ation responsible for its supply, introduction and distribution, the R.N.L.B., 
formed one of the main political issues of the period. The R.N.L.B. 's 
value to employers was widely acknowledged. Coghlan's Private .Secretary 
described this as follows ;
'1. To supply unpopular and isolated employers.
2. To maintain an organisation ready to meet a 
possible sudden falling off of 'voluntary 
labour or increase of demand.
To keep dewn the wages of voluntary5 labour.
(In this capacity it is made more use of than 
is generally supposed.)’(35)
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The R.N.L.B.'s system of pay remission to the labourer’s place of origin 
constituted a useful check upon desertion, and many employers took advantage 
°f this, and the normal twelve month contract for recruits to give out the 
type of job which 'Voluntary /Africans would not accept.
This factor, together with a natural reluctance to be bound to an 
unknown employer for such long periods and a pre-war reputation for sharp 
practice earned by labour recruiters .in general, made the R.N.L.B. very unpopu­
lar with migrants, despite the relatively high rate of wages it offered. 
Returning workers pinned up notices along labour routes, warning their 
compatriots against ’’Chibaro' (1 forced labour' - an epithet applied to all 
recruiters, including the Bureau) , The R.N.L.B. had its European critics 
also. One delegate at the 1925 R.A.U. Congress condemned it as 'a relic 
of the slave trade',(33) and a provincial Native Commissioners' conference 
described the Bureau's lack of interest in its recruits once they were 
distributed as 'nothing less than a public scandal'.(40)
However, the majority of farmers who opposed the Bureau did so because 
it represented in their via/a relic of the detested Company administration; 
its Board of Directors was eliminated by the "old establishment" Which had support­
ed Union in 1922. Furthermore, the Bureau, continued to receive an official 
subsidy in addition to normal capitation fees.(41) The R.A.U. Congress of 
1925 accordingly demanded that the Government should, abolish it and take 
over recruiting, supplanting from revenue any shortfall that might arise 
after the levy of a reasonable capitation xeo. As was noted above, the 
second half of this proposal did not find favour with the Ccghlan ministry; 
however, the Governmentresponded to popular sentiment and its own laissez- 
faire inclinations, and over the nett few years gradually divested itself 
of financial responsibility to the Bureau.(42)
Long before 
supplied only a very 
During the peak year 
only 9 329 recruits, most] 
labour. (43) Apart from :.
■*ts eventual demise in 1933, the R.N.L.E. had in fact 
mall Taro notion of the Colony's labour requirements.
rations in the 20s (1925), the Bureau furnished 
- t/N new farmers unable to secure Voluntary'" 
s bad reputation, there were other reasons for
the Bureau's conspicuous 0f success. In 1925, the Northern Rhodesian authori ti es irmosad an ~ < ■ .. ~ t/t'. of 5 • O on the number the R.N.L.B. was 
permitted to recruit anmally in the Protectorate, an action dictated by 
Cooperbelt needs. The Bu:sv'.u orrhaveurod to overcome Copperbelt and Congo 
competition by raising the basic wage.: presevibea for its recruits from 18/— 
to 22/6,(44) but the putoIv  of labour fren Northern Rhodesia steadily 
dwindled. The African tobacco boom mentioned above had a similar effect on
Nyasaland labour resources.
To close thic d’s.-nsa-'on of Government's response to farmer agitation, 
some reference should b///,;/ to on* of its most controversial decisions, the 
introduction of the Native Juvonil*- iO-pl.oy.Pien, act (1926). This Act was 
passed after the 1325 p a n . ernc-ress adopted a resolution asking that 
'native oiccanins b- v h - o h T d  or in enna way be brought under the provisions 
^ S o ^ n L ;  Act. (451 it that time, African juveniles helm 
the apparent age of 14 were not h-cunl by legally enforceable contracts: a 
Miawi employer complained tint reanPG.sto atxon and even threats were useless
as means of discipline;'
'They merely 
police or Native 
us as we have u
a-cl' aryl nay, 'be are not afraid of the 
r./i/icsi onex ■ they cannot do anything to 
'""site n  * or 5. ore not signed on. be can
just go when it suits un.‘'!
Many farmers supported tlio R.A.U. A 
lation would be introduced not only
(46)
e-solution in ths 
to provide the
. hope that suitable legis- 
necessary control but also
/to augment the supply of juvenile labour for harvesting tobacco.
The Government, which was also concerned by reported cases of 
juvenile indiscipline and felt seme anxiety about the drift of unaccompanied 
juveniles to the towns, drafted a bill to regulate such employment. Enacted 
in 1926, the measure gave Native Commissioners a wide range of powers, sane 
punitive and sane protective. Juveniles could be punished for 'breach of 
duty' or disobedience of a Native Commissioner's order 'given in pursuance 
of the Act'. The latter official was permitted to register contracts, 
regulate conditions of employment with the power to cancel contracts, and secure 
the juvenile’s release from work upon his parents' application. Section 6 
of the Act gave the Native Caunissioner authority to contract juveniles who 
were in towns without parents or guardians for a maximum period of six months, 
reporting such cases to the Chief Native Commissioner. (47) The Act, particu­
larly Section 6, evoked a storm of protest in humanitarian circles overseas.
But despite allegations of 'child slavery',(48) there is no evidence that the 
Act led to wholesale apprenticeship or indeed any augmentation of juvenile 
labour supplies. Section 6 was used only once in the period up to September 
1928.(49) Nevertheless, the Government's motives in introducing the measure 
may be questioned, both from the point of view of timing and the fact that 
two Ministers stated in public that it was passed as a result of the R.A.U.
1925 resolution, an action clearly calculated to allay criticism Of official 
labour policy. (50)
Poor conditions of employment, maltreatment of labour by seme 
individuals, a variety of practices that benefited the employer at the 
expense of his servant, and generally lew wages were instrumental in making 
farms less popular with Africans than work in the mining and urban sectors. 
These factors, which were adversely commented upon by the official Native 
Labour Committee of 1927-28,(51) played a key role in the 1924-28 labour 
supply crisis.
Farmers usually worked their labourers from sunrise to sunset, with 
a one- t two-hour break for lunch at mid-day. Despite official encourage­
ment, few adopted the piecework system used on sate mines and there was 
accordingly little inducement to complete a task quickly. Housing was of 
the most rudimentary, and rations generally comprised only meal and a pinch 
of salt. Sane improvement was noted during the labour crisis: the Native 
Commissioner Marandellas remarked that farmers were beginning to issue meat 
rations to attract labour. (52) A fair proportion of farmers maintained 
first-aid facilities, but the signing-off of sick Africans was not uncommon. (53) 
Minor assaults, often committed in the heat of the moment by exasperated 
farmers, were frequent and gave the industry as a whole a bad reputation; 
often too busy at harvest time to travel long distances to the nearest 
Assistant Magistrate, some employers took the law into their a m  hands and 
punished errant labourers themselves.
The contract and ticket systems were abused by a proportion of 
farmers. Labour contracts were generally made for periods of from three 
to twelve months, but payment was made on the basis of a completed ticket 
consisting of 30 working days. It was customary to mark the ticket when 
a day's labour was satisfactorily performed, although several employers 
in both the farming and mining industries docked tickets for the slightest 
offence. Another practice was to defer payment on one or more tickets 
or illegally retain the servant's Registration Certificate as a check against 
his desertion. A further abuse detrimental to the labour supply developed 
as a result of the 1924-28 crisis, the signing-on of Africans for future 
work. Labourers were given a cash advance and instructed to report for 
duty on a specific day when the farmer anticipated their services would be 
required. In one instance, an African engaged in this way on a four-nonth
8contract was continually out off by his potential employer, who found that 
his services were not needed on the appointed day? eventually, after two 
years, the African managed to fulfil his obligation. The Assistant Native 
Commissioner Wedza reported that local farmers who followed this system had 
twice as many Africans signed on as a labour reserve than were actually 
working.(54)
The speculative character of agriculture during the cotton and tobacco 
boems resulted in several cases of non-payment of wages. Under the law, no 
action could be legally taken unless those affected lodged a complaint in 
person with the police, whereupon they were sent back to employers prior to 
an official investigation. Naturally, few Africans were prepared to risk 
possible reprisals arising from such complaints, and it is likely that as a 
result, the number of prosecutions bore little relation to the total incidence 
of offences. Penalties were usually light, and in any case an additional 
civil action, beyond the means of an average worker, was required to secure 
wages from an obstinate employer. In practice, the majority of labourers 
either waited in the hope that their wages would be paid after the harvest, 
or deserted.(55) The problem, assured grave proportions during the tobacco 
collapse, when many farmors lacked the means to pay their workers. Coghlan's 
successor, H.U. Moffat, adoptad the dubious expedient of suspending prose­
cution in such instances, a. moratorium that was apparently exploited by 
several growers. Subsequently, the Government earmarked a portion of the 
£k m. loan voted to the tobacco industry in July 1928 to assist insolvent 
growers in the payment of due wages.(56)
Taken collectively, all these factors had a direct bearing on farm 
labour shortage. Major Wane, one of the leading Native Department critics 
of contemporary employment practices, trenchantly remarked:
'Complaints /about labour shortage/ are of course 
received, these being in all cases from the type of 
employer who provides better accomodation for his pigs 
than for his native employees and whose general treatment 
of his natives is on the same plane, in fact it is sur­
prising that this type is able to get any labour at all.'(57)
But it is only fair to add that a minority of bad employers were responsible. 
African workers were aware of the chief offenders and boycotted them; the 
unsuspecting who were snared into contract arrangements with this element 
usually seized the first opportunity to desert.
However, as an African correspondent fran Chikore Mission remarked 
at the time, (58) the low wages offered by farmers was the primary factor. 
Available figures for 1924--28 are scarce. There held been a net decline in 
wages of about 25-331/3 per cent during the decade preceding self-government, 
attributable to the annual influx of migrant labour and reduction of farming 
operations in the post-war slump.(59) Wages improved in response to rising 
demand after the 1923-24 season, and reached a peak in 1927: the Chief Native 
Ccrttnissioner estimated that the mean wage for unskilled labourers in March of 
that year was 15/- per month. (60) The following table gives a list of 
available monthly wage figures by district, but only in one case (Marandellas) 
is an annual comparison within one locality possible:-
Monthly farm wages (unskilled adult male African Labour), 1923-28
Hartley 15/- to 18/- Melsetter 10/- Marandellas 10/- to 15/-
Hartley 8/- to 30/- Marandellas 11/- to 15/-
Shamva 12/- Marandellas 10/- to 20/-
Hartley (Norton) July, 12/7; Oct. 20/- Mazoe - Sept.16/'- to 17/- 
Mrewa - A.ug. 17/6 to 25/- Marandellas 20/- to 25/- 
Mazoe - May 16/- to 17/-; Dec. 15/-.
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
Sources: N.Cs' and C.N.Cs1 annual reports; N.Cs' monthly reports 
(month shown above); N.A.R. S.138/40.
Despite Native Department warnings about the long-term effect it might have 
on future labour supplies, a sharp cut in agricultural wages accompanied the 
tobacco collapse.
It is significant that, with few exceptions, most of which represented 
small-workers paying lower wages than the larger companies, the mining industry 
was rarely short of labour at that time. The Minister of Agriculture told 
one farmers' association in March 1927 that the Government had received only 
one complaint of this nature from mines during the present crisis. (61)
The majority of migrants from, the north headed for the principal centres of 
mining activity at Gatooma, Que Que and Shamva after registration; they 
passed through the northern fainting districts of Mashonaland and accepted 
employment there only if compelled by necessity, or if word had spread that 
no work was available on the mines.
The Transvaal in any case offered keen competition to all Rhodesian 
employers in the form of higher wages. Farmers paid about 35/- per month, 
and Rand employers anything up to £4. (62) A group of Nyasa migrants inter­
cepted near Beitbridge told a local official that they preferred to work in 
South Africa as wages in Rhodesia had declined to the point approximate to 
those in Nyasaland.(63) Not only Nyasas were attracted over the Limpopo.
The Native Ccmniissioner Ndanga estimated that 40% of able-bodied men in his 
district were working in the Transvaal at seme stage during 1926.(64) An 
official return from the South African Department of Native Labour, dated 
October 1926, recorded the presence of 3069 Southern Rhodesian Africans in 
proclaimed labour districts of the Transvaal;(65) this was almost certainly 
an under-estimate, as many migrants reportedly evaded the South African 
embargo by passing themselves off as Mozambique Africans. The Chief Native 
Commissioner's minimum estimate of 6000 v;as probably more accurate.(66)
Not only did this substantial efflux of local Africans give the lie to settler 
claims that all Africans were inherently idle, but it also indicated that 
high wages, even if these involved journeys of several hundred miles, were 
an important determinant in choice of employment.
How acute was the labour shortage of 1924-28, and what concrete evi­
dence is there to support the farmers' contention that a crisis existed?
Also, what evidence is there that, as many settlers claimed, Africans were 
only tardily entering the employment sector? Ami absence of statistical 
data(67) makes it impossible to answer the first question in quantitative 
terms. Native Commissioners were required to submit monthly reports on 
the labour situation in their districts, and tabulations of these have been 
appended (Tables II and III). The analysis, based as it is on remarks such 
as 'A few employers have found it difficult to secure labour' (Mazoe, September 
1928), or statements that defy classification like 'Seme employers have more 
labour than they need? in only a few cases is there a slight shortage' 
(Marandellas, March 1927), has obvious limitations, but the picture that emerges 
indicates a mounting deficit in supply from late 1924 to a peak during the 
1926-27 growing season, falling away with the tobacco slump to recover slightly 
in late 1928, as a result of increased mining demand. From April 1930 onwards, 
there is a net surplus corresponding to the onset of the Great Depression.
Despite the qualitative and often impressionistic nature of these 
labour reports, same indirect evidence of a more quantitative nature may be 
adduced to prove the existence of a rapidly rising demand, with the probable 
corollary of mounting shortage in the farming sector. The number of 
European farmers increased rapidly from 2403 in the 1923/24 season to 2912 in
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1927/28, and the acreage cultivated per farmer frar>. 119 to 134 during the 
sane period.(68) A switch to labour intensive crops like cotton, which re­
quired roughly 2, 3 times as much labour than an equivalent area of maize 
and to tobacco, where the corresponding factor was about 10,0, imposed further 
pressure on supplies. Maize acreages similarly increased, except for the 
1924-25 season when many ■maize belt" farmers planted cotton. The desire 
for higher financial returns was again instrumental, but declining maize 
yields per acre in districts such as Mazoe,(70) the result of continuous 
cropping, necessitated the augmentation of lands planted to the crop in order 
to maintain even the same level of production, contributing further to the 
labour demand. In consequence of all these factors, the number of Africans 
in agrarian employment increased faster than the number of white farmers on 
the land;
No.of Afrs. No. of No. of Afrs
Year/Season employed in Agr. farmers per fanner
1921^f 58 542 2 366 24,8
1926/27^ 74 750 2 798 26,7
1927/28 83 985 2 912 28,8
/ 1921 Census returns _
/Summer crop returns, 1926/27_and 1927/28 /C.S.R.2 - 1929 
and C.S.R.l - 1930/
Also, there is evidence to show that a fair proportion of farmers 
wasted or inefficiently managed African labour, thus adding to their difficulties 
The practice of making cash advances against future service, discussed earlier, 
worsened the labour position in the long run as it immobilised supplies in 
several localities. Many employers persisted with old-fashioned, time- 
consuming agricultural practices. The existence of "cheap" labour supplies 
did not provide a really satisfactory basis for its efficient use;, for 
example, the lay-out of farms was often ill- considered, involving labourers 
in long journeys from one job to the next. 'Right under his hat the farmer 
has one of the finest labour- saving devices ever invented,' ccrrmented an 
anonymous contributor to the Rhodesia Agricultural Journal; 'A little more 
use of this device would greatly assist to alleviate the labour shortage.'(71) 
Other farmers, especially those in tobacco who had planted out extensive acreages 
signed on more workers than they could supervise properly, while Rhodesia did 
not lack its quota of !istoep farmers", v.ho, as Clements and Harben have 
remarked, cultivated their lands frcrr. the Meikles Hotel verandah. Finally, 
it is interesting to note that the R.A.U. itself agreed with charges of ineffi­
cient and wasteful use of labour by some farmers.(72)
On the second question, an analysis of the number of indigenous Africans 
employed annually in work other than mining (Table I) (73) between 1924 and 1928 
demonstrates that a rapid increase, amounting to 82%, took place over a four 
year period, although estimates prior to the 1926 Census may have been under­
stated. The rise was well in excess of natural population increase, and if 
one includes those employed on mines and the substantial number at work in the 
Transvaal, the average total employed in the peak year (1927) probably approxi­
mated the 10% of population Native Department officials considered a desirable 
maximum if life in tribal areas was not to be permanently disrupted.(74)
Since the average period of work per year was about four months,(75) this meant 
in effect that in a given year, practically all able-bodied men worked for a 
certain period. This conclusion is supported by a variety of district reports, 
indicating that between 30% .and 80%, depending on the time of year and locality, 
were absent fran their hemas at a particular manent. The labour outflow was 
stimulated by a number of factors1 bad harvests (e.g. in the lav veld, 1926-27), 
continued depression of the cattle market, declining crop yields arising from 
continuous cropping in restricted localities, low prices offered for grain,
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rising African needs and the .annual tax demand. The gradual impoverishment 
of the subsistence sector demonstrated by Arrighi(76) thus furnished a growing 
number of labourers for white employers, as contemporary statistics indicate. 
Under normal circumstances, this number would have boon more than adequate for 
farmers' requirements. The labour shortage was created by extravagent demands
from employers, rather than the failure of Africans to offer their services.
Responsibility for the 1924-28 labour supply crisis thus rested with 
the farmers themselves. Low wages, poor conditions and abuses of the ticket 
system, accompanied by ill- treatment on the part of same employers made farm- 
work in general less desirable than other types of industry. But these were 
essentially background factors which had always been characteristic of farm 
work. The single cause that threw them into sharp relief was the wave of 
speculation that beset the farming industry during the optimistic years of the 
mid-'twenties. An under-capitalised economic sector yielding only a medest
return upon investment - in 1927 only about one out of twenty farmers earned 
sufficient from the soil to pay income tax(77) - hoped to ''strike it rich" 
with new crops. In the process, it absorbed ~ often wastefully - large 
supplies of labour, and all but outstripped available labour resources inside 
and outside Rhodesia.
oOo ■ -
TABLE I ; AFRICANS IN INDUSTRIAL 1923-1929
Work other than mining Mining Total at work
Indigenous Nbn-Indig. Total Indig. Non- India. Total Indig. Non-Indig. Total
1923 39 000 62 000 101 OCO 10 300 27 800 38 100 49 300 89 800 139 100
1924 38 700 62 100 100 SCO 11 ICO 30 300 41 400 49 800 92 400 142 200
1925 44 561 63 000 107 561 10 572 29 072 39 644 55 133 92 072 147 205
1926 69 096 64 037 133 133 11 442 30 605 42 047 80 538 94 642 175 180
1927 70 688 67 200 137 888 12 062 29 984 42 046 82 750 97 184 179 934
1928 70 572 63 579 134 151 12 669 31 034 13 703 83 241 94 613 177 854
1929 59 612 56 576 116 188 11 741 33 744 45 485 71 353 90 320 161 673
Source: CNC's Annual Reports, 1923-1929.
Notes: 1. The estimates for "Work other than mining'- are very approximate,
us only mines were required to submit returns for African employed.
2. The 1926 census (Nay) indicated that 67 331 indigenous Africans 
wore engaged in work other than mining, a figure which suggests 
that the earlier CNC's estimates were under-stated.
3. Note the drop in the non-mining sector from 1928 onwards.
TABLE II: DISTRICT LABOUR. SUPPLIES, 1924-8; TEN PRINCIPAL FARMING DISTRICTS
DISTRICT Number of months when local N.C. reported shortage (all sectors)
1924/ 1925f 1926 1927 1928
Mazoe 3 5 11 8 7
Salisbury 0 ,11.{ 5 4 0
Lcmagundi 5 6 9
Hartley 0 6 12 10 2
Gwelo 1 6 12 9 11
Bulawayo 0 0 1 -■ 0
Ontali 1 1 6 5 : x
Marandellas 2 3 10 7 4
Victoria 3 12 12 12
Makoni 0 2 5 8 1
Sources; N.C.s’ monthly reports in NAR S 138/1, S 138/40 and S 235/519-22. 
f only six sets of monthly reports extant 
f only eight scats of monthly reports extant.
No adjustment to make up for the missing months has been attempted.
- represents districts for which lass than four reports on labour
supplies have been made in a given year. These have been considered 
an unreliable guide and arc oirdtted frcm the table.
Notes: 1. Districts chosen are the ten highest employers of agricultural 
labour as reported in the 1931 Census; the preceding Census 
of 1926 lacks the reauisite information.
2. N.C.'s reports rarely make a distinction between agricultural 
and other labour supplies, and both are incorporated in the 
table.
3. The table records net shortages after making allowance for the 
frequent juxtaposition of surpluses and shortages within the 
same district. Fortunately 'the majority of reports make a net 
assessment for a v/holo district.
4. No distinction has been made in this or the next table between 
"slight" and "serious-' shortages.
TABLE III : Number of districts reporting shortages in all employment 
sectors; by month,- 1924.1930. (Total districts; 32)
Year Month Monthly average
J F M A i. ■ J J Ai r< ( ) N D
1924 3 4 5 6 7 10 6
1925 7 5 7 7 8 9 13 ~ 13 9
1926 14 12 8 10 12 10 10 13 14 17 17 20 13
1927 17 15 10 o 10 10 11 13 12 14 14 12 12
1928 11 9 5 6 6 6 6 7 8 12 11 8 8
1929 9 10 8 6 s 10 8 9 10 10 11 12 9
1930 12 8 8 rV 4 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 4
Sources: As for T'.able II, plus MAR S 235/523-4 •
Notes 1. Dashes indicate no returns available for that 
particular month.
2. A certain number of districts, such as ’"toko, Mrewa 
and Darwin, where local labour requirements were 
small, rarely recorded shortages or surpluses. In 
other cases, N.C.s simply omitted to record the 
labour situation. 'Jo adjustment or extrapolation 
has been attempted in these instances.
Over the period 1924-30, an avcraae of about five 
districts tailed to provide these monthly statistics.
3. Seasonal shortages traditionally occurred towards 
the end of the year, when local Africans returned 
home to plough, and in March April when they 
harvested crops.
4. lining areas reported shortages, due to increased 
production, frera late 1928 to early 1930.
5. From Aoril 1930 onwards there was a consistent net
surplus of labour.
TABLE IV:, Monthly inflow? of migrants, 1926-1928,. numbers registered
by Native Commissioners
Year Month Total
J F M A M J J A P O N D
1926 3118 2298 2076 2661 4303 5406 6118 5886 5041 4319 4440 3514 49 188
1927 2628 2175 2128 2738 3762 4352 5925 7100 6157 5775 5172 4549 52 461
1928 3831 2494 3618 4078 5855 5724 6151 6432 4429 4305 43^7 3563 55 107
1929 3207 1738 1916 3422 4766 4993 7317 8303 5330 5298 5271 3969 56 130
Average for month
1926 3196 2176 2435 3225 4672 5119 6378 6930 5389 4924 4800 3999
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Source QIC's covering reviews to NC!s monthly reports, MAR S235/520-3.
Notes- 1. The CNC's covering revievrs to available monthly reports for
1924 and 1925 aremissing.
Note the steep rise in August and September 1927, corresponding 
with the slump in African grown tobacco earlier that year in 
Nyasaland.
2.
Non-ineugenous Africans registered at the Train 
Mashonaland ‘ports of entry", 1923-29.
TABLE V;
Year DARWIN MREWA MTOKO UMTALI
1923 12 176 9 855 1 605 4 972
192<i 13 858 5 967 1 580 6 914
1925 10 358 3 538 1 089 2 428
1926 16 209 109 .1 252 2 841
1927 24 308 71 1 379 2 946
1928 25 802 63 2 136 4 656
1929 28 766 60 2 337 5 582
Source NC's annual reports, NAR S 235/501-7.
Notes: 1. A sub-station was opened at .Rusambo (Darwin district)
in July 1925 to expedite labour flow: figures are 
included under Darwin. The new centre diverted 
migrants from Mrewa and Mtoko.
2. The completion of idle Tete-Blantyre road augmented the 
flow through Mtoko from 1926 onwards.
TABLE VI: Non-indigenous Africans registered, and passes
issued to non.indigenous Africans to leave
country, 1923-29
Year Registrations Passes to leave Colony
1923 33 534 17 055
1924 36 21C 19 923
1925 38 103 22 384
1926 42 859 25 046
1927 43 050 28 565
1928 50 034 37 074
1929 50 161 30 064
Source r CNC's Annual Reports, 1923-29.
Notes * 1. The difference between the two columns would
seem to indicate a growing non-indigenous popu­
lation in Rhodesia. This indubitably occurred, 
but many left the country after completing their 
contracts without obtaining the necessary pass.
2. Discrepancies with the totals in Table IV will
lie apparent. The data in column one was furnished 
by the Registrar of Foreign Natives, whereas 
Table IV totals derive from district reports: 
thus the differences nay be due to error between 
two offices. On the other hand, it is conceivable 
that they may represent those migrants who ob­
tained alien Registration Certificates to 
facilitate their passage to South Africa and had 
no intention of seeking work in Rhodesia. If 
this is so, then about 5CXX>-6500 trans-Zambesian
migrants mast have entered South Africa each year.
3. Note the increase in passes to leave the country 
during 1928, corresponding with retrenchments in the 
tobacco industry.
TABLE VII; Area under summer crops, 1913/11 to 1927/28
(European farmers only)
Season Acres Season Acres
1913/14 161 268 1923/21 286 837
1917/18 276 108 1924/25 334 604
1919/20 211 094 1925/26 355 500
1921/22 228 0C0 1926/27 346 033
1922/23 266 607 1927/28 389 824
Source: Annual Reports, Director of Agric./Sec. , Dept, of
Agriculture, 1914-1928.
TABLE VIII: Cotton production, 1923/21 ■ 1926/27.
Season Yield (lbs) Acreage Yield per acre
1923/24 1 690 538 3 947 128
1924/25 5 888 462 62 858 93
1925/26 8 219 525 66 086 124
1926/27 734 786 8 134 90
Source: Statistical, returns on summer 
Agricultural Journal.
crops, Rhodesia
TABLE IX:: Virginia tobacco production, 1923/24 - 1928/29.
(lbs)
Season Yield (lbs) Acreage Yield per acre (lbs)
No. of 
Growers
1923/24 3 870 460 8003 485 166
1924/25 2 405 90' 8441 285 176
1925/26 5 659 809 12915 438 336
1926/27 19 264 551 30164 639 763
1927/28 24 889 244 46622 534 987
1928/29 6 736 433 17127 393 N/A
Official Year Book for the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, 1930 
(No.2); Report of the Sec., Dept, of Agr. for 1929; 
Statistics of summer crops in Rhodesia Agricultural Journal.
Sources;
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